We extend the theory of government agency survival from separation of powers to parliamentary government systems. We suggest that agencies are at increased risk following a transition in government, prime minister, or departmental minister and in cases where the actors in the political executive overseeing an agency are different to those establishing it. We evaluate these expectations using survival models with a dataset of all UK executive agencies from 1989 to 2012. The findings show that ministers seek to make their mark through terminating agencies created by previous ministers, which is reinforced by high media attention to the agency.
presidential control, reduce this effect and consequently create a credible commitment between the coalition of actors establishing such an agency and the supporters of that coalition. 8 Among advanced democracies, the United States is an outlier. Most other countries in this group have parliamentary systems. In these systems it is very difficult for any incumbent coalition to credibly pre-commit the governmental apparatus to a course of action that cannot be completely overturned at the next election. 9 Many organizational changes can be undertaken by the executive without the need for legislation or other approvals. Consequently, we expect very different forces to determine the survival of government agencies in parliamentary as opposed to separation-of-powers systems. The main changes in the executive consist of changes in the party in power, the prime minister, and individual departmental ministers. Ministers have long been a subject of research but recent work has for the first time systematically mapped out the pattern of ministerial survival and the role of the prime minister in hiring and firing ministers. 10 Changes in party control of government and prime ministerial changes have recently been linked to periods of relatively high change in the policy agenda defined as the list of policy issues prioritized by the government. 11 However, the effects of executive change on agency survival have not previously been assessed.
The first section of this paper sets out the theoretical argument about how the incentives for elected governments in parliamentary systems affect the survival of 8 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989; also see North 1993; Lewis 2004. 9 Moe and Caldwell 1994; Huber and Lupia 2001; Tsebelis 2002; de Figueiredo 2002; Elgie and McMenamin 2005 . 10 Blondel 1985; Rose 1987; Warwick 1995; Strøm 2000; Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding 2012. 11 Baumgartner and Jones 2009; John and Jennings 2010. government agencies. Our theory sits within the broader literature about party governments, prime ministers and departmental ministers who are central to our analysis because the government agencies we examine fall under their responsibility.
The second section describes our new dataset of UK 'executive agencies' over a twenty three year period between 1989 and 2012. The start of this period marked a time when this new organizational form began to be implemented in the UK. The third section reports our findings that ministerial change drives agency terminations and that this form of political change trumps agency performance because poor performance against targets does not appear to raise the risk to survival.
The final section sets out conclusions about the importance of these ministerial changes, contributing to a growing literature using quantitative data to analyze the key 12 James 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2003; Pollitt and Talbot 2004; James and Van Thiel 2010; Verhoest et al. 2012. role of these actors in governments 13 and developing implications for theories of executive politics and priorities for future research.
Changes in the executive and the survival of government agencies
The structure of government agencies matters because agencies institutionalize approaches to public policy by putting distinct activities under the control of managerial leadership that is specific to each agency. Agency structures affect the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of government action and embody sets of relationships between the agency and actors across the government system and beyond. The principal actors within the political executives of parliamentary systems have a strong interest in the organization of government agencies for these reasons.
These actors also have a position in the government system that enables them to make changes to agency structures. Parties in government require organizations to implement their policies and deliver their programs to voters. 14 Governing parties tend to have fairly stable core tenets on a range of policy issues and represent broad, enduring interests among segments of the electorate. Parties in government have a direct interest in closing down agencies they feel do not promote their agenda which breaks up those management structures and sends a signal about priorities for the government. In the U.S. context, Lewis notes that "administrative agencies never escape the politics that created them" 15 and their survival is endangered by political changes that bring different priorities to the fore. Research has examined political 13 Dowding and Dumont 2009; Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding 2012. 14 Ranney 1954; Kaufman 1976 . 15 Lewis 2002, 92. changes in parliamentary systems as part of work on government duration. 16 A lack of congruence between a party currently in government and the party that established a government agency implies a greater risk of these agencies to be terminated, as they were established to implement the policies of another party. In summary, for an agency in any given year, party congruence means that the governing party that established the agency is still in power; prime ministerial congruence means that the prime minister that established the agency is still in power;
and ministerial congruence means that the departmental minister who established the agency is still overseeing it. An incongruent state along any dimension implies a more dangerous environment for an executive agency.
22 Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding 2012, 66. As well as periods of congruence or incongruence, our theory focuses Boyne et al. 2009. We extend the analysis of performance beyond performance targets to the broader context to consider factors that might not be picked up by targets. We use media attention to agencies, defined as the number of newspaper stories about each agency each year, as a proxy for this performance context. Media coverage is a valuable proxy because previous research has established that there is substantial negativity bias in press reporting of public service performance, such that attention predominantly reflects perceived problems with the agency. 33 We also interact this agencies' capacity to defend themselves is agency size because it has been suggested that greater size partially insulates agencies from termination thanks to the larger constituencies an agency can assemble to protect itself. 37 We therefore also include a control variable for staff size.
The functions agencies serve may also influence their survival, bringing with them differences in the organizational environment. 38 We control for types of function, noting whether an agency is primarily oriented toward regulatory, research, or service outputs. The latter category is further split into agencies predominantly serving clients outside government and those predominantly serving inside government.
Agencies' chances of survival are also likely to be affected by the overall munificence 36 Moe and Caldwell 1994; Huber and Lupia 2001; de Figueiredo 2002. 37 Aldrich and Auster 1986; Wollebaek 2009 . 38 Dess and Beard 1984. of the fiscal environment. 39 We therefore control for central government public spending in our analysis.
Data and methods
We test our propositions about the survival of government agencies by looking at all UK-wide executive agencies in the United Kingdom government, beginning with the first agencies of this type created in financial year 1988/89 and covering all such agencies directed by central government up to and including financial year 2011/12.
The bodies were set up following the recommendations of a report by the Prime
Minister's Efficiency Unit called the 'Next Steps' for improving management in government, a term by which the reform to create executive agencies became known in the UK and internationally. We focus on these bodies because they were a new organizational form created to carry out the executive functions of government, constituting a break with the earlier form of organization when the executive functions were predominantly bundled up within departments rather than being handled by distinct organizations. Whilst some individual elements of the executive agency organizational model were used prior to 1989 (for example organisational mission statements and objectives), after this date, for the first time, the full model of organisation was systematically implemented across all of UK central government.
Executive agencies all share a defining governance structure comprised of a chief executive (agency head) with a senior management team, a Framework Document overseen by their parent department setting out the agency's mission and objectives, and a regime of performance targets linked to the objectives. The chief executive is accountable for the agency and has considerable management freedom to 39 Lewis 2002; Adam et al. 2007. deliver the agency's objectives within the prescribed accountability to ministers.
Agency heads are held to account for operational performance by their supervising departmental minister who also approves the agency framework document and performance targets. The minister is part of the government and is ultimately democratically responsible for the agency to the legislature and broader communities.
Ministers have the power both to create and to abolish executive agencies without requiring legislation to change the organisational form and as such they provide a good test of our hypotheses concerning changes in the political executive leading to higher risk of abolition. The type of bodies we examine contrast with independent regulatory agencies that have become increasingly common in many OECD countries where credibility of policy is sought by giving these organisations formal protection against termination by political executives. Many studies have relied instead on official lists of organizations which are not grounded in analytical concepts of survival, as is discussed in recent reviews of this literature. 42 We define termination of a government agency as occurring when its governance structure (of defined roles for managers formally leading an organization and associated accountability mechanisms) has been ended. In the context of UK 40 See Gilardi 2008, who also discusses how even formally independent regulatory organisations vary considerably in their de facto independence from political executives in practice. 41 Kaufman 1976. 42 Rolland and Roness 2009; Laegreid and Verhoest 2010 executive agencies, we take the ending of a Framework Document to mark the ending of that distinct agency. We do not count change of name only as termination and require a termination to entail an ending of the agency governance structure.
Our analysis covers executive agencies for UK-wide functions in the period 1989 to 2012. Country-specific agencies for the devolved parts of the UK which report to the administrations of Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland are not included.
Throughout the period these bodies reported to their corresponding territorial departments or to their formally devolved administrations since 1999. The specific local accountability arrangements and separate political executives operating in each devolved area mean they are not covered in our analysis.
We assess the hypothesized relationships between political congruence, agency performance, and the termination of agencies using survival analysis. This method attempts to avoid some of the problems which have been identified with earlier studies of organizational longevity. Kaufman found that many agencies in the US were highly durable by comparing agencies at the start and end of a period, ignoring agencies that came and went in the meantime and inflating his estimate of durability. By contrast, Lewis included all the agencies created and abolished in between the two snapshots used by Kaufman, resulting in much higher estimates of agency termination. 43 We follow Lewis by including all agencies existing in the period 1989 to 2012 in our dataset. Figure 1 provides an overview of the total number of UK-wide agencies in each year since this type of organization began being established (financial year 1988/89). In the figure, the total number is also broken down into agency creations, agencies that live on in a year, and agencies that are in their final year, i.e. the year in which they are terminated. 43 Kaufman 1976; Peters and Hogwood 1988; Lewis 2002, 90-91; . We analyze agency survival using discrete time models with financial years as the unit of time. This approach matches performance information, collected annually (for each financial year 44 ), to survival periods. In our analysis, the dependent variable is whether agencies are terminated or not in a financial year (termination is coded 1; agencies that continue are coded 0). Eighty percent of all agencies terminated were formally shut down in the last two months of the financial year. We use logit to estimate our models. Under the following conditions, logit is a useful estimator for discrete time survival models such as ours (Allison 1984; Beck et al. 1998; Jenkins 2005) : (i) the data are properly structured such that each row in the data set contains either one year at risk for an agency or the year in which the agency is terminated; (ii) 44 there are no observations that do not either cover an agency-year at risk or an agency in the year of its termination; and (iii) the baseline hazard is modeled in some form.
We fulfill all of these conditions. In particular, we model the baseline hazard fully non-parametrically by including one dummy for each agency age in our data set.
Our key explanatory variables include congruence at three levels: the party, High performance here is defined as a target achievement percentage more than one standard deviation above the within-financial year mean of all agencies, while low performance is defined as a target achievement percentage more than one standard deviation below the within-financial year mean of all agencies. For either operationalization, we additionally include interaction terms between target achievement and media attention using the media stories z-score introduced above.
Considering the proportion of targets met provides a way of comparing performance across a set of agencies handling different activities. This is similar to using the U.S. federal government's (now discontinued) Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) scores as indicators of performance. 50 There is no evidence in the UK 49 The performance information is available in agencies' annual reports and in the Next Steps Annual
Reviews produced by the UK Cabinet Office.
50 Lewis 2007; Gilmour and Lewis 2006a; Gilmour and Lewis 2006b. that the agencies' performance targets suffer from the apparent partisan bias that has been noted about the PART scores and they are less vulnerable because they serve a different purpose by being mainly a tool for ministers' direct control over their agencies. At the same time, the targets do share some aspects of PART, such as extensive reliance on documented evidence.
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We characterize agencies by function and institutional features. All executive agencies we examine were newly established as separate management structures at a point in time from 1988 onwards. However, most of the functions of these agencies were already being carried out by UK central government prior to the creation of these agencies. While most functions were carried out directly by central government departments, some were instead being produced by organizations with their own distinct governance structures. We include a dummy variable for executive agencies that are successors to such distinct organizations. In the base category are organizations that were units or sections within government departments; that were created from a split, a merger, or a replacement of an existing executive agency; and agencies that did not exist in any form prior to being set up as an executive agency.
We group agencies by their primary function, using three dummy variables, into those primarily producing for external customers (e.g. the public or private sector organizations), engaging in regulation, or conducting research. Agencies primarily producing for internal customers (i.e. government departments) form the base category. As noted above, function has been highlighted by previous work as potentially associated with survival.
As further controls, we operationalize agency size by the number of full-time equivalent permanent staff members. We include the overall amount of central 51 This degree of financial independence is likely to make these agencies more immune to termination in challenging circumstances, for instance by permitting them the opportunity to dip into reserves, alter their pricing structures, or identify new sources of income.
For all time-varying explanatory variables we use a one-year lag to allow sufficient time for them to affect the risk of termination. The timing of our modelling strategy is shown for a two year example period in an appendix online at the sites given earlier for the data used in this article. Our one year time lag for the variables we evaluate hypotheses about and all other independent variables reflects the process of organizational closure because it takes several months to arrange from the initial decision. New ministers, prime ministers, or parties in control of government operate in this timeframe -but it does not take as long to close executive agencies as might be the case if legislation to abolish them was required.
It is very difficult to terminate an agency mid-way through a financial year because budgets have been set and 8 out of 10 terminations occur in the last two months of the financial year. Furthermore, if we did not lag our independent variables by a year, we would be at risk of our dependent variable, terminations, occurring before some of the other events that are our predictor variables occurring ( 1945 -1997 (Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding 2012 reports. Data on the number of media stories for each agency each year were collected by searching the online media stories database Nexis.
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Findings
When reporting our models (in Tables 2 and 3) , we compare the odds of continuation versus discontinuation of an agency, with continuation as the base category. All the models contain 1,291 observations on 153 executive agencies which existed during the period of our analysis. Each observation denotes a financial year or 'spell' of each agency in the dataset (see Table 1 for summary statistics of all variables in these models). To test our hypotheses, we estimate two sets of discrete-time survival models, with a logit link function. We make no assumptions about the baseline hazard -it is modeled non-parametrically by including a dummy variable for each of the ages of executive agencies included in our analysis. Table 2 shows two models with performance operationalized linearly, as a percentage of targets achieved. Table 3 shows an alternative specification with performance operationalized discretely, with dummies for high and low performance relative to all agencies within a financial year.
All other variables are the same as in Table 2 .
We examined whether hazards are proportional. This assumption is violated for ministerial change and we addressed this non-proportionality in two ways. The first is to multiply ministerial change by the survival time of agencies, in other words, by agency age. Models incorporating this approach are in the first numerical columns of Tables 2 and 3 . The second approach is to break up the ministerial succession indicator into two dummy variables: change from the minister who established the agency to another overseeing minister, and any subsequent changes in overseeing ministers. This distinction is of theoretical interest, as the first minister to take over responsibility for a new agency is, in most cases, overseeing a fledgling organization.
The mean ministerial tenure of 28.7 months of ministers, including those creating agencies, results in new ministers taking on new agencies that are only a year or two old at that time of this first ministerial succession. This time-span is too short to show sufficient outputs for a decision about its merits to be made, and abolishing an agency that had just been set up would likely to raise questions about ministerial competence rather than demonstrating competence.
We address issues of potential left or right-censoring in our analysis. Leftcensored spells would be cases where an agency was already in existence before it entered our data set and experienced a termination. In a strict sense, there is no case like this since there were no executive agencies prior to the start of our data (financial year 1988/89). In a broader sense, however, there is a concern in that some executive agencies, while their formal creation marks their entry into our data set, have had predecessor organizations within central governments. Our analysis therefore includes a dummy variable for agencies that previously were organised as separate bodies outside of a department but within central government and as such had some management freedoms before being restructured as an agency, although they did not have the full package of governance arrangements that define executive agencies.
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As is common in large parts of the literature using survival analysis, and all analyses of the survival of government agencies, we assume that the process leading to the right-censoring point (in our case, the end of our data collection) is independent of the processes determining the length of time an agency survives. If this assumption is correct, right-censoring, that is, an end to data collection at a particular point in time, does not make our estimator inconsistent. This approach is reasonable because the data period encompasses the important types of event that theory suggests might potentially affect the survival of agencies. We have no reason to believe that there are types of events or changes to the agency landscape that occur after 2012 that are likely to affect agency survival in ways which are different to those which occur within our time period. Two factors that arguably affect context, the current period of spending austerity and the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition, date from 2010 and are included in our analysis. There are also other periods of tight spending associated with fiscal squeeze in our dataset as well as the current one, for example in the early 1990s. We address dependence of some of the terminations in our estimation sample. There are 16 instances where two or more agencies have linked deaths because they become merged into a new or different entity. We address this nonindependence by clustering our standard errors on the sets of linked agencies. All of our models incorporate this adjustment. 58 We checked for endogeneity of the dummy variable with possible selection effects such that formerly freestanding organizations differed in their survival in ways not fully modelled, inducing inconsistency. Our sensitivity analysis tested whether the sign and statistical significance of our explanatory variables changed when previously freestanding organizations are excluded. In three out of four specifications all findings remained the same. In the right-hand specification in Table 3 , the only change is that the media stories z-score base term drops just below statistical significance but retains its positive sign. Overall this analysis reveals no substantial selection effect.
We report the results of our statistical models in Tables 2 and 3 . The odds of the event of termination are instances of the agency being terminated divided by instances of the agency continuing its existence for another financial year. We report odds ratios in Tables 2 and 3 . Odds ratios are the odds for the event of termination for a level of an independent variable divided by the odds for the event of termination at a one unit lower level of the same independent variable. The odds ratios are obtained by taking the exponential of the estimated logit model coefficients. An odds ratio smaller than one indicates that a one unit increase in a variable is associated with reducing the odds of termination by that multiple whereas an odds ratio greater than one indicates that a variable is associated with increased odds of termination by that multiple. For our dummy variables of change in the political executive the odds ratio shows the factor of increase or decrease in the odds for the change compared to the reference category of no change in that variable. .6 These discrete-time survival models are estimated by logistic regression. All time varying right hand side variables are lagged by one year. The figures provided are odds ratios; odds ratios greater than one indicate an increased risk of agency termination, and odds ratios less than one a reduced risk. The figures in parentheses are z-statistics, adjusted for clustering for each set of that are dependent on each other in terms of their termination. That is, there are 16 clusters. The baseline hazard is fully non-parametric, i.e. we include a dummy variable for each agency age existing in these data with variation in terms of agency survival (we include dummies for 18 ages). These dummy variables are not listed here. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. -329.8 These discrete-time survival models are estimated by logistic regression. All time varying right hand side variables are lagged by one year. The figures provided are odds ratios; odds ratios greater than one indicate an increased risk of agency termination, and odds ratios less than one a reduced risk. The figures in parentheses are z-statistics, adjusted for clustering for each set of that are dependent on each other in terms of their termination. That is, there are 16 clusters. The baseline hazard is fully non-parametric, i.e. we include a dummy variable for each agency age existing in these data with variation in terms of agency survival (we include dummies for 18 ages). These dummy variables are not listed here. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Our hypotheses concern political executive congruence and transitions. There is no evidence that party congruence or changes in political party control are associated with agency termination, nor do we find a systematic relationship between Prime Ministerial congruence or succession and agency termination. Looking at ministers, however, we find a pattern in accordance with the expectations of our theory. Being overseen by the minister who established an agency is associated with substantially lower odds of termination in all our models with a minimum estimate of 46% lower and a maximum of 57% lower odds.
We also report the relationships using predicted probabilities of termination.
Whilst the predicted probability of termination remains low in all cases, ministerial variables are associated with sizeable and statistically significant percentage changes in the probabilities. The presence of the founding minister for the agency lowers the probability of termination. Using the example of model 2 (ii) calculated at mean values, being overseen by the founding minister is associated with a four percentage point lower predicted probability of termination of 0.05 (plus or minus just under 0.02 in a 95 percent confidence interval) rather than 0.09 (plus or minus 0.02 in a 95 percent confidence interval). These findings suggest that ministers do not change their priorities within their period of tenure so drastically that they abolish agencies they themselves had set up. This is consistent with wanting to appear competent, especially in the context of the short length of most ministers' tenure as discussed previously, where such an immediate volte-face might suggest lack of command of the ministerial brief.
We analyze the relationship between termination of agencies and ministerial succession for different forms of succession. We find that it is not the change from the founding minister that increases risk but rather the changes from the second minister in an agency's life span onwards that raise the odds of agency termination. Tables 2 and 3 report that the first ministerial change in an agency's lifespan is associated with a reduced risk of termination whereas subsequent ministerial changes are associated with an increased risk of termination. This finding is in accordance with ministers terminating agencies to reflect new policy goals or to provide a signal about their competence, their high standards for government activity and their motivation. The initial phase of an agency's existence, before the agency has had time to be fully established, is too short a time span for ministers to decide to terminate the agency. No agencies were abolished within two years of being set up and only one within three years, the rest surviving to four years or longer. In terms of changes of minister, 77 percent of first ministerial changes (110 out of 142) occurred in this initial phase within three years of an agency being set up. In contrast, new ministers that were subsequent to the first replacement minister occurred just 5 percent of the time (21 out of 414 replacements of subsequent ministers) in the first three years of an agency being established.
The increased odds of termination following a subsequent ministerial change are evident where an agency is featured in a large number of media stories relative to its historical level of media attention. The predicted probabilities of termination following a subsequent ministerial change for different levels of the variable media stories z score are shown in Figure 2 . A plausible interpretation of this finding is that, given the negativity bias of the British media, agencies that become the focus of the media (with z scores above zero) are not performing well in the eyes of ministers, even though they may achieve a high percentage of their performance targets. In such a case, incoming ministers can be expected to weigh an agency's perceptions in the media when deciding the agency's fate. 
Conclusion
Departmental ministers are key actors in determining the survival of government agencies in the UK parliamentary system. In the absence of electorally visible performance criteria for ministers and the agencies they oversee, and given the short tenure in particular posts, ministers find the abolition of agencies a way to signal their policy intent and control of the organizational structure of government. These findings lend support to research on policy agendas in the UK and other countries which has found changes in attention to policy programs following changes in party government and prime ministers. 64 It extends the insight about the consequences of changes in executive politicians to changes in the organization of government agencies and points to the importance of changes in individual departmental ministers in this process. In so doing, it also provides support for research that emphasizes the importance of these ministers as key actors in parliamentary systems. 65 We find that politics, here in the form of ministerial succession, trumps performance in determining agency survival. This finding extends the generality of the primacy of politics over programme performance that has been found in other contexts, notably in the determination of appropriations to federal programs in the U.S. 66 Agency performance does not seem important for agency survival in the eyes of UK ministers, which is a potentially surprising result given ministers' interest in 64 Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Jennings and John 2009; Jennings 2010. 65 Blondel 1985; Dowding and Dumont 2009; Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding. 2012 66 Gilmour and Lewis 2006a; Gilmour and Lewis 2006b. targets being met in order to avoid being blamed for low performing agencies. We suggest that their incentives are to announce new initiatives and avoid negative media attention, reflected in terminating agencies, rather than planning to raise long term performance. The idea of ministerial hyper-activism is a common view of UK central government but is relatively little studied with systematic empirical evidence, and our findings provide support for this thesis.
The high level of organizational instability in the system creates disruption costs as agencies are terminated 67 that are not demonstrably balanced by improved performance. Using central government's own measures we assessed if new agencies performed better than those they replaced either as a consequence of a merger or an outright replacement. We compared all pairs of predecessor and successor agencies in our data on the proportion of targets met, subtracting the former from the latter to create a measure of difference in target achievement. The mean was -1.8 (median -1.6) indicating slightly higher performance by the predecessor agencies (although not statistically significantly different, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference (p = .42)). These findings raise serious policy questions about the operation of this form of reorganization of government, which appears to have neither performance causes nor performance consequences on the measures presented by government as a key mechanism for their accountability.
The agency characteristics that we find are associated with survival -function of the organisation and financial autonomy -indicate that ministerial politics does not explain the whole picture. Institutional design has previously been noted as an important influence on survival in other contexts. 68 Executive agencies in the UK share a lack of legal protection from termination but our research design allows us to 67 
